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2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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5	IN RE: NEW ENGLAND COMPOUNDING) MDL NO. 13-02419-RWZ PHARMACY CASES LITIGATION)
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8)
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10	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RYA W. ZOBEL
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14	MOTION HEARING
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16	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse Courtroom No. 12
17	One Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210
18	
19	June 3, 2014 9:30 a.m.
20	
21	Catherine A. Handel, RPR-CM, CRR
22	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse
23	One Courthouse Way, Room 5205 Boston, MA 02210
24	E-mail: hhcatherine2@yahoo.com
25	

1 APPEARANCES: 2 For The Plaintiffs: 3 Hagens, Berman, Sobol, Shapiro LLP, by THOMAS M. SOBOL, ESQ., 55 Cambridge Parkway, Suite 301, Cambridge, MA 02142; 4 5 Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, by J. SCOTT SEXTON, ESQ., 10 Franklin Road, S.E., P.O. Box 40013, Roanoke, VA 24022-0013; 6 (Appearing telephonically.) 7 8 FOR THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS: 9 Brown Rudnick, by DAVID J. MOLTON, ESQ., Seven Times Square, New York, NY 10036; 10 Brown Rudnick, by KIERSTEN A. TAYLOR, ESQ., One Financial 11 Center, Boston, MA 02111; 12 13 For the Defendants: 14 15 McGuire Woods LLP, by STEPHEN D. BUSCH, ESQ., One James Center, 901 East Cary Street, Richmond, VA 23219-4030; 16 17 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, by MATTHEW J. MATULE, ESQ., 500 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02116; 18 Tucker & Ellis LLP, by MATTHEW P. MORIARTY, ESQ., 19 1150 Huntington Building, 925 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 20 44115-1414 (Appearing telephonically); 21 22 FOR PAUL D. MOORE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE OF 23 NECP, INC.: 24 Duane Morris LLP by MICHAEL R. GOTTFRIED, ESQ., 100 High Street, Suite 2400, Boston, MA 02110-1724. 25

1 PROCEEDINGS (The following proceedings were held in open court before 2 3 the Honorable Rya W. Zobel, United States District Court Judge, United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, at the 4 5 John J. Moakley United States Courthouse, One Courthouse Way, 6 Boston, Massachusetts, on June 3, 2014.) 7 THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. 8 COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK URSO: Good morning. This is 9 the New England Compound Cases, MD-13-2419. 10 THE COURT: Would anybody who expects to argue by 11 telephone please identify him or herself. 12 MR. SEXTON: Your Honor, this is Scott Sexton calling 13 from Roanoke, Virginia. 14 THE COURT: Do you anticipate arguing? MR. SEXTON: Yes. 15 16 THE COURT: By the way, your affidavit, as it was 17 filed in the Court, is missing Pages 2 and 3. 18 MR. SEXTON: We filed a corrected declaration hours 19 later, your Honor, and hopefully that was brought to your 20 attention as well. 21 THE COURT: Well, I'll look it up on the docket. Ι 22 hadn't looked for a supplement yet. 23 Okay. So, we have Mr. Sobol for plaintiffs' 24 committee, or whatever you call yourself, and for --25 MR. BUSCH: Your Honor, my name is Stephen Busch.

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      I'm with McGuire Woods and I represent Insight Health Corp.,
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      and will be presenting the argument in support of their motion
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      this morning.
               MR. MATULE: My name, your Honor, is Matthew Matule,
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 5
      Skadden Arps, also on behalf of Insight Health Corp.
               THE COURT: Your last name?
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               MR. MATULE: Matule, M-a-t-u-l-e.
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               MR. MOLTON: Your Honor --
               THE COURT: Mr. Sexton, was that for the Roanoke
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10
      plaintiffs?
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               MR. SEXTON: Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And, I'm sorry, somebody else announced
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      himself on the telephone.
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               MR. MORIARTY: Matthew Moriarty for Ameridose, your
15
      Honor.
16
               THE COURT: And whom do you represent?
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               MR. MORIARTY: Ameridose LLC.
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               THE COURT: That's your law firm?
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               MR. MORIARTY: We're Tucker & Ellis LLP, is the law
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      firm.
               THE COURT: And Ameridose LLC is the client?
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               MR. MORIARTY: Yes, one of the main affiliated
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      defendants.
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               THE COURT: But you don't expect to argue?
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               MR. MORIARTY: It's remotely possible because my
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      client has ten cases in Virginia, but they don't fall under
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      the same procedural category as Mr. Sexton's cases, because
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      the ten --
               THE COURT: You're the Lipton something firm?
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 5
               MR. MORIARTY: -- are in federal court, not state
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      court.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I think Mr. Busch has the floor
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      since it's his motion that we're hearing first.
               MR. BUSCH: May it please --
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               THE COURT: There are a number of people who intend
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      to argue. I hope that we can keep this to ten minutes apiece.
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               MR. BUSCH: Thank you, your Honor. I'll certainly
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      endeavor to do that.
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               COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK URSO: Sir, I'm so sorry, but
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      could you argue at the microphone? Because no one on the
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      telephone can hear you unless you're at the microphone.
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               THE COURT: And you can sit down if you want to do
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      that because the microphones aren't really long enough for
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      standing. I know it's difficult for some lawyers, but try.
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               MR. BUSCH: Very difficult, your Honor, but I'll do
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      my best.
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               THE COURT:
                          We also have Mr. Gottfried.
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               MR. GOTTFRIED: Yes, for the trustee.
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               THE COURT: And for the trustee -- you're not for the
25
      trustee?
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               MR. GOTTFRIED: I am for the trustee.
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               THE COURT: You're for the trustee?
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               MR. GOTTFRIED: Yes, your Honor.
               MR. MOLTON: Your Honor, Mr. Molton, David Molton,
 5
      for the committee, here with Kiersten Taylor.
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               THE COURT: The creditor's committee?
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               MR. MOLTON: Yes, the creditor's committee. We're on
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      mic now, I understand, your Honor.
               THE COURT: Okay. And you are here -- I'm sorry.
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10
               MR. MOLTON: Ms. Taylor is with me for the creditor's
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      committee.
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               THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, okay. All right.
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               Mr. Busch, proceed. I'm sorry.
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               MR. BUSCH: May it please the Court. Again, Stephen
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      Busch on behalf of Insight Health Corporation.
16
               We're before the Court on Insight's emergency motion
      for entry of an order in aid of the Court's decision
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18
      transferring additional personal injury and wrongful death
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      cases from Roanoke, Virginia and seeking to enjoin the
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      plaintiffs represented by Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore.
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               We seek the Court's intervention caused by ongoing
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      actions by the Gentry Locke law firm representing 18
23
      plaintiffs, your Honor, whose cases are pending in the circuit
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      court of the City of Roanoke and that are subject to the
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      trustee's supplemental motion to transfer dated December 27,
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2013.

Your Honor granted the motion to set forth in your memorandum of decision dated May 15th, asserting jurisdiction over those cases and directing that the cases be transferred to MDL-2419 pursuant to 28 --

THE COURT: Is the issue that animates your motion

the -- I don't know exactly what the status of it is -- the

status of motions to dismiss by defendants that were ruled on,

but not docketed by the Judge in Roanoke?

MR. BUSCH: Your Honor --

THE COURT: That's what I understand to be the status of those motions.

MR. BUSCH: It is Insight's position -- and we had a declaration available to be tendered to the Court this morning -- that our position is that in these 18 cases, that the legal motions to dismiss -- we call them "Demurrers" in state court procedure in Virginia -- that they were not noticed for a hearing, they were not argued, and that they're not mature for the Court's entry of orders and there's a dispute on that, and Mr. Sexton's declaration indicates that their position is that they were subject to this decision in Wingate. Your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, isn't this an issue that the Judge down there should decide? I mean, if the Judge, in fact, decided these for all -- with respect to all plaintiffs, but

failed -- but somehow they didn't get on the docket, should not that happen if the Judge says -- he decides it? I mean, why should I decide as to what the Judge decided when the Judge can do that directly?

MR. BUSCH: Judge Zobel, we think that the issue before the Court is where the jurisdiction of the cases lie at this time. We do not believe that jurisdiction lies in the Circuit Court of Roanoke, given the fact that your memorandum decision granted the trustee's motion on May 15th and --

THE COURT: Yes, but until I give an order to transfer, they're there. I mean, I just think -- I'm wondering whether the Judge should not be given an opportunity to be heard on what it is that the Judge thinks he did.

MR. BUSCH: Your Honor, I think -- in essence, I think it begs the question of where the jurisdiction lies. When you entered your memorandum decision, you transferred the cases, and it is very well established in the law that we cited in our brief, your Honor, that under the All Writs Act, that this Court has the ability and is authorized to issue an injunction in aid of its jurisdiction.

The case that we cited, Judge Zobel, which is directly on point with this particular issue is that where you have the opportunity for the state court to enter a judgment that's inconsistent potentially with the duration of the litigation, that the Court is authorized to move forward and

take appropriate action. We think that is the case.

Mr. Sexton, apparently, thinks that these are uncontested motions and he even terms it "ministerial."

Ministerial, I think, in trying to skirt the jurisdiction issue.

Our position is unequivocal, Judge. These are disputed, controverted orders that go to the heart of the case. We do not believe that they have been noticed. We don't think they have been argued, and we don't think it's appropriate for the Court to enter the order.

If you allow the Circuit Court of Roanoke to sort this out, there are other motions in other cases that are being transferred from Virginia and you've set up a perfect opportunity for there to be a conflict between the state court order and any future order that this Court enters. If it were true that the parties agree --

THE COURT: Why is there a conflict? I'm assuming that these motions to dismiss were denied.

MR. BUSCH: Well, your Honor, we are mindful of the fact that you did not authorize the filing of a reply and, therefore, we did not tender a reply to the plaintiff's brief.

Mr. Sexton has a detailed declaration. He states unequivocally in that declaration that there was an agreement off the record in chambers with Judge Dorsey that his ruling in one case, Wingate, would apply to all the rest of the

1 cases. 2 We were not there, your Honor. McGuire Woods was not 3 counsel for Insight on February 27th of 2013. However, we reached out to Mr. Clinton Shaw of the Bonner Kiernan law firm 4 5 in Washington, D.C. We shared Mr. Sexton's -- our declaration 6 with him. We asked him, in representing Insight, what is your 7 recollection of what occurred off the record. I have that 8 declaration. We circulated it by email to all counsel 9 yesterday. With the Court's indulgence, I would be happy to tender it to the Court. 10 11 THE COURT: Well, I would like to have it. 12 (Attorney Busch hands document to the Court.) 13 THE COURT: Now, we have a conflict as to what 14 happened, which is a conflict that I guess you would agree 15 goes to the heart of the case. 16 MR. BUSCH: That's exactly right, Judge, and that's 17 why we believe it should be sorted out here where the cases 18 are now transferred and that the idea --19 THE COURT: How can I sort it out, short of putting 20 the Judge on the stand and saying what happened? 21 MR. BUSCH: Well --22 I mean, you believe one lawyer more than THE COURT: 23 another? 24 MR. BUSCH: -- it's interesting, Judge Zobel, because 25 as to your memorandum of decision, the plaintiffs have told

you courts only speak through their orders.

So, here we have an off-the-record discussion that counsel for Insight says there was no agreement that an order entered and a decision made in one case when only 11 of these 18 cases were even filed with the Court would apply for all time in all the other cases.

Now, our declaration that my partner Christopher

Trible filed with the Court indicates that the Wingate

decision doesn't reference these other cases. The order that

was entered in Wingate doesn't say it applies to any other

cases. Furthermore, Judge, there was no order entered that

consolidated the cases.

So, it's interesting that while they say you can only speak through an order and, therefore, jurisdiction still exists in Roanoke, apparently an off-the-record discussion that's disputed by counsel for Insight -- former client for Insight and our client at this time, that that court doesn't need to speak through its orders.

So, we believe, Judge, that having transferred these cases and issued your memorandum of decision, and with the follow-on to that by Insight, Judge, which we did several things. Number one is when Mr. Sexton sought a hearing date, we sent a letter to him saying the cases have been transferred. We suggest that you stand down and ask that you stand down and not move forward. Jurisdiction is now

MDL-2419.

Second, we filed a notice of assertion of bankruptcy jurisdiction and transfer to MDL-2419 in each of these 18 cases. We provided the Roanoke court with a copy of your memorandum and decision. We believe that having granted the motion -- and you used the term "allowed" in there -- that that effectuated a transfer of the cases.

We believe that nothing further need be done for these cases to be in Boston other than the administrative issue, which is to the fact that you mention -- you solicited the input of counsel, what needs to be done to follow on to your decision.

And as far as we're concerned, Judge, jurisdiction has been transferred and under 28 U.S.C. Section 157(b)(5), the cases are now MDL-2419 and that administratively all that need be done is the entry of an order that requests that the Circuit Court of Roanoke physically transfer the files, but the physical possession of a court file is not equivalent to the concept of jurisdiction.

You found, pursuant to the trustee's renewed motion, that there is related-to jurisdiction based upon the filing of a proof of claim by Insight and also based upon the filing of proofs of claim by all 18 of these plaintiffs.

So, your Honor, our position is that under the law that we've cited under the All Writs Act, that this Court has

the -- all that's necessary in terms of issuing an injunction naming this jurisdiction because the -- there's a lot of litigation left to be done in these cases and it's a game -- this isn't a ministerial act, Judge. It's a hotly disputed issue, as you can tell from these declarations, as to whether a single decision in Wingate does not say it's pursuant to any agreement or a consolidation and the order that was entered in Wingate does not indicate that it was either, that under those circumstances, that we think that this Court should enter the injunction.

I would also add, Judge, quickly, mindful of your admonition on the amount of time, that the plaintiffs filed a so-called status report in the Roanoke Circuit Court. There's no pleading in our Title 18 Form of the Code of Virginia that refers to the filing of the status report. There's no rule of the court that talks about the filing of a status report.

Mr. Sexton's clients filed this status report in each of these 18 cases and Mr. Sexton directly sent to the Court an exemplar of the status report and in that he said two things that I think are of particular interest, Judge.

As to your memorandum and decision, he says, "The Judge in Boston issued her opinion on May 15th, 2014, indicating that she would grant the trustee's motion," that you would. You would. We read your memorandum decision to say unequivocally that you "allowed" the motion. That's a

completed act.

And the second issue in this so-called status report is that -- and this is at Paragraph 11 where they specifically say -- Mr. Sexton, "Plaintiff believes that this Court still has jurisdiction."

Well, your Honor, we think that the Circuit Court of Roanoke does not have jurisdiction. You have transferred the cases. You have sought the input of counsel that has been provided in terms of an orderly process for the court file to be transferred. We filed with each -- with this Court the notice of the assertion of bankruptcy jurisdiction and transfer of these cases and we believe that's all that need be done to notify the local state court that these cases are now in MDL-2419. We believe --

THE COURT: What do you say is the meaning of the very last sentence in my opinion which says that, "Counsel shall inform the Court regarding any steps necessary to effectuate the transfer"?

MR. BUSCH: Judge, from our perspective -- and we feel 100 percent confident in telling you this. We think that means how do I get the court file. There are 20 court files in the Circuit Court of Roanoke. What needs to be done to notify the clerk to send those court files to us?

And I would say one other thing, Judge, and that is that the plaintiffs confuse the concept of Rule 58 in terms of

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an appealable order with what you have done. The creditor's
      committee, Mr. Molton, filed an excellent brief with the Court
      in response to the plaintiffs' filing, making it clear that
      this is interlocutory. Judge Saylor said it was interlocutory.
               THE COURT: I'm not concerned about the appeal,
      frankly. I'm concerned about where we are now.
               MR. BUSCH: But the --
               THE COURT: I have two issues. One is whether, in
      fact, a transfer occurred at the moment I said the motion is
      allowed.
               MR. BUSCH: We believe, yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: That the motion --
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              MR. BUSCH: You granted the motion.
               THE COURT: I know you do, but that's one issue to be
     decided.
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               MR. BUSCH: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Particularly in light of the last
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      sentence about "effectuating transfer."
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               And the other issue is who should decide whether, in
      fact, the Virginia Judge made the ruling with respect to all
     plaintiffs or not?
               MR. BUSCH: Judge, again, I think that -- that
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     because you granted the motion --
               THE COURT: I understand that.
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               MR. BUSCH: -- and you found that there's related-to
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1 jurisdiction, that at that point in time that -- and I believe 2 that the trustee's position is the same. We certainly 3 contacted the trustee yesterday and spoke with him -- that this is a self-effectuating order or decision --4 5 THE COURT: So, what happens next? Assuming you're 6 right. What happens next? The cases come here and the 7 plaintiffs will say that the motion to dismiss was denied and 8 you're going to file another motion to dismiss and the 9 plaintiffs are saying it's already been decided by the court 10 in Virginia. 11 MR. BUSCH: Judge, the first thing --12 THE COURT: So, what do I do? I bring the Judge up 13 here and put him on the stand? 14 MR. BUSCH: Judge Zobel, the first thing that's going 15 to happen is already on the way, and that is that Insight is 16 in discussions with the creditor's committee about 17 participating in the mediation. 18 So, this -- keep in mind that we're backing up all 19 the way to Judge Dorsey entering -- issuing a letter opinion 20 on October 31 of 2013 and entering an order in November. Why do you think, Judge Zobel, that after all of 21 22 those months pass, you issue your opinion or your memorandum 23 of decision and, all of a sudden, lickety-split, the 24 plaintiffs are racing to Roanoke to try to get orders entered. 25 They had no problem having other orders --

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THE COURT: You're arguing the substance of this
issue.
       That is that I should disregard their suggestion that
the Judge had decided this question but just hadn't been
docketed. That's how I understand the plaintiffs' position.
And you're just saying, well, you know, you decided it, in
essence, or it wasn't decided.
         MR. BUSCH: Judge, I think that any substantive
ruling on these cases from this point -- or, actually, from
the point of the issuance of your memorandum of decision, we
think should be in MDL-2419, and if the Circuit Court of
Roanoke has jurisdiction to issue a decision on these 18
cases, as the plaintiffs have presented, does that mean that
there's jurisdiction for depositions to go forward? Does that
mean that there's -- we certainly had deposition dates that
have been reserved.
         THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from other counsel.
         MR. BUSCH:
                    Thank you.
         THE COURT: Who wants to argue next?
         MR. SEXTON: Your Honor, this is Scott Sexton.
may speak, I would like to address these issues.
         THE COURT: Did you hear the recent colloquy with Mr.
Busch?
         MR. SEXTON: Yes, your Honor, I heard every word of it.
         THE COURT:
                    Okay.
         MR. SEXTON: And I'm prepared to address it.
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THE COURT: Tell me, Mr. Sexton, why the May 15th opinion did not effect the transfer right then and there.

MR. SEXTON: Well, your Honor, we believe that like every other memorandum opinion that's issued by courts every day and it expresses the reasoning of the court, it expresses a decision by the court and it lets the parties and the appellate court know the rationale for that decision.

It is informative and it was informative to us. It, however, is not an order, and the court speaks for its order, and we cited First Circuit cases that establish that the First Circuit is just like the Fourth where I practice, and that is absolutely required.

We cannot imagine how a memorandum decision would ever be considered an order in and of itself. We received your order. We took it to be what it was, a memorandum decision issuing an opinion that was contrary to our asserted positions, but also asking for the parties to provide guidance as to how it should be effectuated, and then we did provide that guidance by subsequent filing.

So, that is -- we view it as any other memorandum opinion and I think it's only due to an overzealous desire to have it effectuated immediately, that someone, you know, as skilled as Mr. Busch would argue that it is somehow an order as well. It's not an order. So, we have shown no disrespect to this Court and we intend to show no disrespect to this

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      Court, but --
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               THE COURT: So what, Mr. Sexton, is your view of the
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      status of the cases in Virginia?
               MR. SEXTON: Okay, your Honor. In that regard, I
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      think it's unfortunate that you're missing Pages 2 and 3 of my
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 6
      declaration, but --
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               THE COURT: You said you had filed them.
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               MR. SEXTON: -- on Page 5 of the declaration, it sets
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      out the three categories of outstanding orders that are needed
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      in Roanoke. There are ten cases that require orders denying
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      leave to amend requests for admissions and denying
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      reconsideration of partial summary judgment. Those were all
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      noticed and heard and are awaiting order. The Judge has
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      already indicated his ruling on that vis-à-vis the Wingate
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      opinion.
16
               So, that is -- those have been noticed and heard and
17
      argued, and there's no argument, as Insight advances on
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      another category, that they were never noticed.
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               The second category is --
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               THE COURT: What does being "noticed" mean? I mean,
      are they part of the -- have they been recorded in some way?
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22
      I mean, I understand there was a decision in the Wingate case.
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      Has that decision by a written order been made applicable to
24
      all of the other cases?
                                 That is the point. They were all
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               MR. SEXTON: No.
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1 argued on the same day. 2 When I say "pursuant to written notice" -- in 3 Virginia procedure we typically, although we are not required to do so in every instance, provide a notice that alerts the 4 5 Court as to what case is going to be called when we arrive for 6 the hearing. 7 THE COURT: And what cases did that order include? 8 MR. SEXTON: Well, in this instance, these were noticed on that first category in all eleven cases that were 9 10 at issue and --11 THE COURT: Now, the opinion apparently has only 12 "Wingate" in the title. Was that decision in any way 13 docketed? 14 MR. SEXTON: The Wingate decision was docketed in the 15 Wingate case. And, otherwise, the orders need to be entered 16 as to these other issues. 17 And I would mention that Insight's motion does not 18 affirmatively take issue with any aspect of this category of 19 orders. They only talk about the orders on Demurrers, which 20 are motions to dismiss, that they filed. So, they have not 21 complained about my first category, which is a very 22 substantial category that we've asked the Roanoke court to 23 deal with. 24 THE COURT: And what's that? 25 MR. SEXTON: Pardon me?

1 THE COURT: What category? 2 MR. SEXTON: The first category -- the first category 3 of orders that are outstanding, which is on Page 5 of my declaration, Paragraph 18(A), the ones that deny Insight's 4 motion for leave to amend admissions and to reconsider partial 5 summary judgment that's been granted against it. 6 7 So, that's one category on which Insight has advanced 8 no contrary argument. They have not briefed and they have not 9 asserted any position that those were not fully briefed and 10 argued in court. 11 THE COURT: Yes, but were they decided? I mean, my 12 problem is I don't understand what the Judge did. 13 MR. SEXTON: Well, the issues are identical in each 14 case. 15 THE COURT: Yes, but just because one case is 16 decided, if an identical issue comes up, are you saying that 17 the decision in one case automatically without more applies to 18 all the other cases? MR. SEXTON: Your Honor, what I'm saying is that in 19 20 this instance, all of the issues were identical and they were 21 all argued on the exact same day. 22 THE COURT: But orders were -- an order was only 23 entered in one case. 24 MR. SEXTON: Right. And that was due to our neglect. 25 I mean, that's simply a housekeeping matter. The Judge

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certainly indicated -- I mean, believed he was ruling on all
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      ten.
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               THE COURT: How do we know that? How do we know
      that?
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               MR. SEXTON: Because we began this whole process,
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      your Honor -- if I go back to my declaration, which Mr. Busch
 7
      takes issue with, but --
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               THE COURT: I have it here. Page 5 you're looking
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      at?
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               MR. SEXTON: Oh, my declaration. I'm now describing
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      on Page 2, 2 of the declaration.
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               THE COURT: Well, Page 2 is one of those I think I
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      don't have.
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               MR. SEXTON: You would have it on 1161.
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               COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK URSO: Judge, do you want me
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      to print this?
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               MR. SEXTON: All right. Your Honor, let me just
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     briefly summarize what happened.
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               When we arrived in court on February 27th -- and this
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      is on the record at the end of the hearing -- the Court
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      explained to us that they had lost two judges in the circuit
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      and that these were going to require some procedural and
23
      administrative issues, which he invited us back to talk about,
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      and he said there was no need to do it on the record. He
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      wanted to do it off the record.
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So, we all go back, all counsel go back -- and, by the way, my recount of this is contained in the declaration and I also sent this declaration to counsel for the other three defendants, IGPM and the two doctors, days ago, days before I filed it, and I asked them to verify it and make sure that it was consistent with their recollection. They confirmed that by email to me. And so, I have a great deal of confidence that my memory on these issues is correct.

Having prefaced his statements with the fact that the Court was down -- understaffed now by two full-time judges, he asked us to try to be efficient in this case. We explained that we would have 18 or 19 identical cases. He explained that he was going to be the judge on all the cases that we filed, Gentry Locke, and all the other meningitis filed that were filed in Roanoke Valley.

He explained also that because they were short staffed, he was going to need us to help him be efficient as the judge on these things.

Now, the declaration by Mr. Shaw tries to assert that this was only about discovery issues. I would say that that does not pass the common sense test because obviously the Court is not worried about how we conduct discovery. Certainly, we may have talked about discovery at that time, but the reason the Court invited us back was because he was concerned about his docket and how he could be efficient. At

1 that point in time --2 THE COURT: By mucking up my docket. 3 MR. SEXTON: Pardon me? THE COURT: No, nothing. 5 MR. SEXTON: At that point in time we proposed that 6 we would handle matters in a way that was very efficient and 7 did not require duplicate actions by the Court. 8 Again, this is very consistent with common sense. 9 When you have 18 identical cases, twelve as of that day, but 10 we had informed him we were going to have another six or seven 11 that were being filed imminently and, of course, the Court is 12 not going to want to hear 18 or 19 separate motions on the 13 same identical hearing. I'm talking about identical facts 14 pled in the complaint and identical Demurrers filed by the 15 defendants. So, that is the context in which this arose. 16 Now, when the Wingate opinion did come out -- I 17 notice that Mr. Shaw's declaration says after Judge Dorsey's 18 ruling, Insight did not agree to entry of orders in the other 19 18 cases. 20 That may be true in his memory, but if lead counsel 21 at that time, whose name is Heather Dean, asked me in the 22 presence of counsel for the other defendants if we were going 23 to file all 19 amendments at the same time, all 19 amended

complaints, and they expressed their concern that that would

be overwhelming. We all agreed as three groups of counsel not

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to do that.

So, while he may in his mind be able to justify saying that there were -- there was no agreement -- they certainly asked me if I was going to file all 19 amendments at the same time, and I would say that certainly implies that they were confirming the understanding we had with the Court at the very beginning, that these matters would be handled in an efficient way so that the Court would not have to have serial hearings on the same exact issue in each case.

THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Sexton.

How do I decide what you have now created as a question of fact? How do I decide this?

MR. SEXTON: Well, your Honor, I believe your inclination to have Judge Dorsey in Roanoke, Virginia review these things just for the purpose of entering orders where he believes he has already ruled on the issues of substance --

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what he believes, frankly, but defendants certainly don't think that they argued all 18 cases or that the argument on Wingate applied to all 18. And to the extent that the Judge signed his Wingate opinion, but then did nothing with the other 18, what's the significance of that?

I mean, the main question I have is both of you are raising an issue of fact as to what the Judge down there did, and unless I agree with Mr. Busch that my opinion effected a

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      transfer immediately, the issue still has to be decided before
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      the transfer can take place, I think, unless I short circuit
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      and say transfer, okay, now.
               MR. SEXTON: I believe that -- if I could go back to
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      what I was walking you through initially, which is that there
      are two -- I mean, there are three categories of these orders,
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      and the second category are the Demurrers by the defendant
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      IGPM, the other defendant. I've spoken with those counsel.
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      They fully agree that the orders should be entered in all
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      those cases because the Judge has already decided them.
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               THE COURT: What counsel?
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               MR. SEXTON: So, they have no -- that's not even this
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      defendant who is complaining to you. That's the other group
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      of --
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               THE COURT: Who agreed -- excuse me, Mr. Sexton.
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               Who agreed that the other -- that there should be
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      docket entries as to all?
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               MR. SEXTON: Counsel for Image Guided Pain Management
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      agreed with me on the phone last week --
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               THE COURT: But that's not this defendant.
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               MR. SEXTON: But that is one of the categories of
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      orders that needs to be administratively answered, and that is
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     my point.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else that you
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      wish to add?
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1 MR. SEXTON: Yes. 2 THE COURT: Quickly. 3 MR. SEXTON: As to the third category of orders, they are the motions to dismiss filed by this defendant and as to 4 5 those, we believe we have set out why those issues have already been decided, but that is, again, just --6 7 THE COURT: Those are not before me, are they? Those 8 particular cases are not now before me, are they? 9 MR. SEXTON: They are not before you, but those are 10 the ones that animate the motion that has been filed by 11 Insight. As to the larger points, your Honor, I believe the 12 13 most important thing for you to understand in this motion is 14 that there is no emergency to this Court's jurisdiction, which is the way that Insight had to cloak its motion in order to 15 16 plausibly bring it to you as an emergency injunction against 17 attorneys and plaintiffs 700 miles away. Under that standard 18 for the Anti-Injunction Act, it has to be absolutely necessary 19 in aid of this Court's jurisdiction. It is very limited. 20 It's very narrow and it's very strictly construed. 21 And the plaintiffs' steering committee has joined in 22 and supports the notion that the Roanoke court should be 23 allowed to handle what it -- this housekeeping issue and enter 24 appropriate orders that it believes it has already decided.

There is no emergency. We gave 47 days' notice

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before we selected the hearing date that Insight chose for the presentment hearing, and as an accommodation of that, I won't even be there. I'll be out of the country.

We also advised this Court at the same time that we were presenting orders to the Roanoke court. There has no rush and there has been nothing but transparency.

I believe that the absolute foundation for Insight's argument rests on the false underpinning that the May 15th, 2014 decision by this Court is an order. It accomplishes the exclusive jurisdiction. It accomplishes removal and transfer all in one package, and it is precisely not any of those.

So, here presentment to the Roanoke court would aid this Court and would aid any court to know what the Roanoke, Virginia Judge has already decided about Virginia state law issues.

So, I think in this sense, Insight is picking a fight with the Roanoke court when none is needed and certainly no need has been demonstrated.

If Insight is correct, just play it out and Insight is correct in all that it says, then -- and this Court has already done all the things that Insight heaps onto the decision on May 15th, then an order by the state court in Roanoke is meaningless and it would be void, in any event. Certainly, no one needs to be enjoined.

So, we tried to lay these out as best we can in our

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papers on short notice. Again, I direct your attention to
Pages 2 and 3 of our declaration and also particularly to the
plaintiffs' steering committee's response, which I believe
brings a very common sense and pragmatic approach to this.
         So, your Honor, with all of -- for those reasons, we
just respectfully request that the emergency motion be
declined.
         THE COURT: Okay. Who would like to be next, Mr.
Sobol, Mr. Gottfried or Mr. Molton?
         MR. SOBOL: May I, your Honor? Is that all right?
         MR. MOLTON: Go ahead, Tom.
        MR. SOBOL: Thank you. Good morning, your Honor.
I'll try to be brief.
         THE COURT: For those on the phone, Mr. Sobol for the
plaintiffs' committee is speaking.
         MR. SOBOL: Thank you.
         The threshold issue is whether or not your memorandum
opinion effectuated the transfer right then and there. The
only two things I'll add is this:
         First, of course, you at the end of a very thorough
memorandum indicate that you want quidance from the parties as
to how to effectuate it. I think you couldn't be more clear
as a result of that, that it's not self executing.
                                                   I think if
we peal behind that, though, there are reasons why it's not
self executing. The parties had briefed the issue of
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jurisdiction. Is there related-to jurisdiction? Is there ascension that's necessary?

The parties had not briefed -- I'm going to make an effort to educate the Court regarding tricky issues, frankly, in these circumstances.

How does the case get removed? How do we effectuate it? We look at the jurisdictional statute. I mean, there are many cases in federal court where the federal court has jurisdiction that is not exclusive to the state courts and where even though the federal court has jurisdiction over it, for some reason or another, the case hasn't been properly removed or something like that in a timely way and the state court simply goes forward.

And if you look at these statutes, they're tricky right now, which is why the PSC has -- we've punted on these issues for a couple of days. We filed a memorandum regarding what the Court should do on this.

THE COURT: I noticed that.

MR. SOBOL: Well, because -- you know, you look at -there's a jurisdictional statute. It only tells you about
jurisdiction. You look at 157(b), it sort of looks like it's
transferring things within the federal court system, and you
sort of say to yourself how is this going to work. So, I just
don't think that the memorandum can be looked at as being self
executing, number one.

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The second thing is that the PSC looked hard at the declarations and at the emails that Mr. Sexton sent us from other defense counsel to at least make sure that there wasn't some kind of monkey business going on here. We would not, in other words, want to be a part of something if there were state court lawyers trying to effectuate some kind of substantive ruling, you know, behind the scenes or without any kind of transparent way and try and basically get away with something.

We're not saying that Mr. Sexton is right and the other guys are wrong. We don't know that, right. But we just didn't know that -- more than passes the smell test. Mr. Sexton's declaration has a ring of truth to it in the sense that you have lawyers trying to be practical with an overburdened state court system, moving forward and not doing a bunch of ministerial things, like filing amended complaints, to then have Demurrers filed on them, to then have the Court issue the orders, because Mr. Sexton is getting ready for the trial of the Wingate matters and the lawyers want to spend their time dealing with that, and there are many situations, frankly, and I think that Mr. Sexton is overdoing it, you know. I don't think it's neglect. Although in retrospect, it might be neglect, but there are lots of things that are just sort of practical rule of law taken care of, you know, the details don't get followed through.

But my final point is simply this:

If you allow the state court judge to determine whether or not he should enter these rulings or not, you will at least have that information, when and if these cases get to you. If you don't, then you won't know what was intended, at least by the state court judge.

Also, there's a little bit of irony here. Even if these cases are brought up right now and we don't have any of this procedural mishegas going on and the Demurrers are before you or the question as to whether or not the admission by these defendants that they are not healthcare providers and, therefore, aren't subject to any medical malpractice caps, that's the kind of question which you might say, Well, gee, why don't we go ask the state court judge what he thinks about the -- you know, the strengths of the state law claims or whether or not these things that were stated to him or filed in his court should bind you. So, you'd probably be asking him, anyway.

So, I think the practical thing is -- oh, and also, by the way, if you do let this go forward and if the Judge does enter an order one way or another, you'll still be able to revisit it here as to whether or not there are some shenanigans that went on in connection with that or not.

So, I just think that the practical solution to -oh, then also this: Your memoranda asks for guidance as to

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what you should do under these circumstances. My view would have been -- before this whole hullabaloo came along, my view would have been, well, does the state court judge have any tidying up of his docket to do before it gets here? Particularly if there are things that are not yet finished and which the Court might -- it might help the Court be educated about what happened there. So, my position would have been, if there's any housekeeping to be done, let the couch be cleaned before it gets sent here, anyway. THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Gottfried or Mr. Molton. MR. GOTTFRIED: Thank you, your Honor. Michael Gottfried for the trustee, Paul Moore. Your Honor, you posed two questions. The first question is: What was the impact of your order? The trustee attempted to answer that question with its proposed supplemental order, which was Docket 1137. that proposed order, which was in response to the last sentence of your ruling, we suggested that you grant the motion effective as of May 15th, 2014, and our position is you have the power to do that, and we urge you after you have a chance to consider our order to enter it. We think that that is the appropriate way to effectuate your memorandum of decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(5). THE COURT: And leave any disputes about what

happened in Virginia in Virginia? Or maybe it will come

along.

MR. GOTTFRIED: As to your second question, the trustee really expresses no opinion. We weren't there. We don't know what happened. We think the parties have presented that to you for decision and obviously you will have to decide that issue.

But our dog in this fight is we would like to get these cases here as soon as possible. We'd like you to consider our proposed order and enter it so we can proceed forward in the MDL.

You heard that there's a great interest, perhaps, in mediation. We would like to get those cases here and get going with that just as soon as we can, and obviously no position on what happened in Roanoke. We weren't there. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Molton.

MR. MOLTON: Your Honor, I'm not going to repeat what Mr. Gottfried said, but a number of things.

We, again, join Mr. Gottfried in urging the Court enter an order as soon as possible. We leave it to your Honor in that order whether to leave it to the Virginia Judge or not or to yourself to deal with certain, as Mr. Sobol said, house-cleaning items, but I do want to make an important point.

Without divulging confidential discussions, there is significant interest in getting these parties into mediation.

That has to happen sooner rather than later. We've got planned discussions coming down the line over the summer. It is the intent of the trustee and the committee to see if we can file a disclosure statement with a plan by the end of the summer, end of August, early September.

Any delay on not only this case, but other cases, creates a number of ripples that delays the ultimate. So, what we're concerned about, looking at how your Honor formulates the order, is that -- we're informed by Mr. Sexton that there is a hearing now for June 27th. I wish that hearing would have been earlier in Virginia so that if your Honor was inclined for the Virginia Judge to deal with these issues, it could be dealt with and the cases could be transferred.

THE COURT: This is a hearing on what?

MR. MOLTON: My understanding is there is a conference in front of the Virginia Judge on this matter that has been set by Mr. Busch on behalf of his clients as well as by Mr. Sexton on behalf of his clients for June 27th.

Our fear from the committee -- and I'm presuming that the trustee will join with us -- is that that will create ancillary litigation that would drag on the summer.

So, to the extent that these issues, you know -- and, as Mr. Sobol said, you know, let the Virginia Judge do housekeeping. We're also fearful that -- what that term

means, because the term "housekeeping" can be a loophole through which armies can march and issues that aren't even discussed here can be presented.

So, we're urging your Honor in formulating an order, and if your Honor decides to let the Virginia state court

Judge deal with this, to be very exact in exactly what has to be dealt with and the timeframe with which that should be dealt with, because, as Mr. Gottfried says, it's in the interest of all the victims to get these cases here in front of you as soon as possible.

And just one point that Mr. Sobol raised that goes to, really, Mr. Sexton's reconsideration motion that really isn't teed up for today. I know that the trustee and the committee wanted to file --

THE COURT: I've had some briefing on that. Motion for reconsideration is denied.

MR. MOLTON: Thank you.

In any event, Judge, I just wanted to say that these -- the issue of transfer pursuant to 157 isn't rocket science. Article III judges deal with them all the time, effectuating orders that transfer cases from state courts to their courts, most of the time MDL's like this Court. It's done all the time. It's not unusual. And we have full faith that your Honor will be able to craft an order in accordance with the trustee's proffered order that will do that. Thank you.

1 THE COURT: Thank you. 2 Is there anyone on the telephone who needs to be 3 heard? Needs to be heard. (No response.) 4 5 THE COURT: I take that silence as nobody. 6 Mr. Sobol, you didn't want to anything, did you? 7 MR. SOBOL: Well, I just wanted to make it clear, 8 your Honor, that it's the PSC and the Roanoke plaintiffs and 9 the creditor's committee and the trustee and Insight who are 10 all getting ready to participate in the mediation. The issues 11 before you have nothing whatsoever to deal with in terms of 12 whether there's mediation or the timing of it. 13 THE COURT: You mean if the cases stay in Virginia, 14 there will still be mediation? 15 MR. SOBOL: Of course, there will. 16 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SOBOL: Your Honor, unless Insight decides it 17 18 doesn't want to for some reason, right? The plaintiffs are 19 ready to -- you know, the plaintiffs would like to have a 20 mediation, right, just like you do in every other mass tort when there are state cases and there are federal cases. 21 22 got nothing to do with this, and whether the Judge takes this 23 up tomorrow or the end of June, we're ready to roll. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Busch, you can have one 25 minute. That's all.

MR. BUSCH: Your Honor, this is not a housekeeping matter.

Second, the notices of hearing are crucial. The February 27th hearing, there were no notices of hearing as to Insight. The --

THE COURT: I think you've told me that.

MR. BUSCH: The Wingate case was the only one noticed for that day and had been removed.

Your Honor, Mr. Sexton went through several different categories of orders. There is no reason why if our codefendants don't object to the entry of an order, that they can't just present an order to this Court based upon the transfer of the cases. So, there's no immediacy with respect to our co-defendants.

If they believe that the Court has made a decision, fine, you can enter into a consent order and that can be entered in the MDL, but, your Honor, this is a hotly contested issue. There are 128 plaintiffs. There are 30 cases. There are many cases in which the Demurrers have not been argued. There is a dispute on whether this Wingate ruling should be applied to these other 18 cases. If you allow this to go forward with Judge Dorsey, you're setting this Court up for the opportunity for inconsistent rulings.

We do intend at some point, if we don't resolve the cases through mediation, to bring these motions on in the

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      other cases that have been transferred pursuant to your order.
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               Again, there are 30 cases. There are 128 plaintiffs,
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      and you just simply have to ask yourself -- and I know you
      have -- why -- if this order was entered in Wingate in
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      November and there have been other hearings, why is there no
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      record that there was an agreement or a decision by Judge
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      Dorsey that his ruling in Wingate would apply?
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. BUSCH: Courts speak through their orders, your
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      Honor, and I think that it's important to note that there is
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      no documentation of this putative agreement.
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               THE COURT: Thank you all. I will take the papers
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      and give you as fast a decision as I can manage.
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               MR. MOLTON: Your Honor, can I raise one issue?
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               Your Honor just on the record denied the motion for
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      reconsideration. I want to be clear. The motion was for
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      reconsideration and a stay pending appeal. Is the motion for
      stay pending appeal --
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               THE COURT: The stay is denied. The motion for
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      reconsideration is denied.
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               MR. MOLTON: Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Of course, counsel can go to the Court of
      Appeals and seek a stay there.
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               MR. SOBOL: Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Thank you all.
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                  MR. MATULE: Thank you.
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                  MR. BUSCH: Thank you, your Honor.
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                  (Adjourned, 10:28 a.m.)
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                   I, Catherine A. Handel, Official Court Reporter of
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       the United States District Court, do hereby certify that the
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       foregoing transcript, from Page 1 to Page 40, constitutes to
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       the best of my skill and ability a true and accurate
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12
       13-md-2419-RWZ, In Re: New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.,
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       Products Liability Litigation.
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         June 8, 2014
                                   /s/Catherine A. Handel
                                   Catherine A. Handel, RPR-CM, CRR
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